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24 PLUS HOUR DETENTION 
DOES NOT WARRANT STAY 
R. v. Malhi, 2006 QCCA 338 
 
The accused was arrested for 
extortion at 9:00 am, taken to 
the police station at 10:00 am 
and interviewed until 12:30 
pm. He was a full time bank 
account manager with a wife and children and 
had no prior record. He also promised the 
investigator that he would appear before a judge 
on any conditions. The investigator was unable to 
complete the paperwork necessary to have 
formal charges laid until it was too late to have 
the accused appear before a judge that day. In 
Quebec, all criminal charges must be authorized 
by a prosecutor. The accused was then detained 
where he appeared before a judge at 3:00 pm 
the next day.  
 
At trial in the Court of Quebec the accused 
brought an application for a stay of proceedings 
under s.24(1) of the Charter because he was not 
brought before a judge within 24 hours of 
arrest as required by s.503(1) of the Criminal 
Code. This, he argued, violated his rights under 
ss.9 (arbitrary detention) and 11(e) 
(unreasonable bail) of the Charter. The trial 
judge denied the accused’s application and he 
was convicted of attempted fraud, but acquitted 
of extortion and criminal harassment. 
 
The accused appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal contending the trial judge erred by 
failing to grant the stay of proceedings. In his 
view, the police investigator should have 
released him on conditions under s.503(2) of the 
Criminal Code (promise to appear or 
recognizance). By not releasing him while knowing  
 
his background, the accused submitted his 
continued detention by police was arbitrary and 
he was denied reasonable bail without just cause. 
A stay of proceedings, he suggested, was an 
appropriate remedy.  
 
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the 
accused’s appeal. The police investigator was 
concerned about the gravity of the offence. 
Extortion carries a possible life sentence. The 
officer also felt the accused may have been 
involved in other similar attempts to extort 
money from banking clients. As well, the victim in 
this case appeared extremely nervous of the 
situation and his home telephone number was 
found in the accused’s briefcase when arrested. 
In the officer’s view, it was preferable for a 
judge to determine the accused’s release 
conditions.  
 
The Quebec Court of Appeal, however, made it 
clear that it was not endorsing a practice or 
system that would see an accused in similar 
circumstances not being brought before a judge 
without unreasonable delay and within 24 hours 
of their arrest as section 503(1) of the Criminal 
Code requires. Rather, a stay of proceedings is a 
“draconian remedy…reserved for the most 
egregious violations of the rights of an accused, 
and then only if two conditions are satisfied: 
first, that the prejudice caused by the abuse of 
the accused's rights would be perpetuated or 
aggravated by the continuation of the trial or its 
result; and, second, that no other recourse would 
adequately remedy the resulting prejudice,” said 
the Court. Assuming the accused’s Charter 
rights were violated in this case, a stay would 
not be an appropriate remedy.  The appeal was 
dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
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 ‘IN SERVICE: 10-8’ 
e-LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 
 
“The articles that I have 
read that you publish are 
very interesting and 
informative, it is challenging 
to try and keep up with case 
law in this work, and articles such as yours help. 
Keep up the good work”—K-9 Officer, New 
Brunswick 
************ 
“I recently received a copy of your publication 
and found the up to date case law a good read”—
Police Detective, Ontario 
************ 
“I have recently come into possession of a few of 
your electronic newsletters.  They are first rate.  
I have also learned of some internet sites with 
respect to the courts that I was not aware of”—
Assistant Crown Attorney, Ontario 
************ 
” I have read your publication for at least two 
years and utilized the recent case law for 
discussion on parade. It is always relevant and 
worthy of round table discussion stimulating 
lively discussion”—Police Sergeant, Alberta 
************ 
“I just read your July/August 2006 In Service: 
10-8 newsletter. It was an easy and very 
informative read.”—Staff Sergeant, Ontario 
************ 
“Thank you for sending me the March/April and 
May/June editions of In Service: 10-8. As the 
Training Sergeant…I appreciate your time and 
dedication that you devote to the continuous 
learning and improvement of front line 
officers…”—Police Sergeant, Ontario 
************ 
“Please add me to your distribution list...I am an 
officer…in Ontario and love reading your 
publication”—Police Officer, Ontario  
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS IN THIS ISSUE 
 Pg. 
Canine Odour Detection At Bus Terminal OK 4 
  
Convicted Sex Offender Must Demonstrate 
SOIRA Order Disproportionate 
 
6 
Cumulative Factors Provide Reasonable 
Grounds 
8 
  
Stay Not Proper In 24 Plus Hour Hold 8 
  
Police Need Not Prove Communication In 
Process For Cellphone Charge 
9 
  
Purpose Determines Application Of Implied 
Licence Doctrine 
10 
  
Balance  11 
  
Several Factors Determine Whether 
Detention Occurs 
13 
  
Whole Picture Provides Reasonable 
Grounds  
15 
  
Unless otherwise noted, all articles are authored by Sgt. 
Mike Novakowski, MA (Abbotsford Police). The articles 
contained herein are provided for information purposes 
only and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. Nor are the opinions expressed 
herein necessarily the opinions of the Justice Institute of 
British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” welcomes your 
comments on or contributions to this newsletter. If you 
would like to be added to our electronic distribution list  
e-mail Mike Novakowski at  mnovakowski@jibc.ca 
National Library of Canada Cataloguing in 
Publication Data 
Main entry under title: 
In service:10-8. -- Vol. 1, no. 1 (June 2001)- 
Monthly. 
Title from caption. 
"A newsletter devoted to operational police officers 
across British Columbia." 
ISSN 1705-5717 = In service, 10-8 
 
1. Police - British Columbia - Periodicals.  2. Police – 
Legal status, laws, etc. – Canada – Cases – Periodicals. I. 
Justice Institute of British Columbia. Police Academy.  II. 
Title: In service, 10-8.  III. Title: In service, ten - eight. 
 
 
 Volume 6 Issue 5             www.10-8.ca 
September/October 2006 
3 
 
 
POLICE ONLY NEED 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
DEVICE WORKING PROPERLY 
R. v. Topaltsis, 
(2006) Docket:C44298 (OntCA) 
 
A police officer noticed that 
the roadside screening device 
he was going to use had not 
been calibrated within the 
department’s guidelines before administering a 
roadside test. The device had not been 
calibrated for 26 days, even though it was the 
department’s practice to calibrate the device 
every two weeks. However, the officer had 
spoken to the manufacturer’s representative at a 
trade show and was told the devices only needed 
calibration every six months. The officer also 
checked the device to ensure it properly 
registered no alcohol before administering the 
test. The accused failed the roadside screening 
and subsequently provided a breath sample over 
80mg%. 
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge concluded the officer did not objectively 
have reasonable and probable grounds for making 
the breath demand because, in part, the device 
had not been calibrated within the department’s 
policy. The accused was acquitted on a charge of 
over 80mg%. The Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice dismissed the Crown’s appeal, holding 
that the fail reading did not provide reasonable 
grounds because the device had not been 
calibrated within police guidelines. The Crown 
then appealed to the Ontario Court of Appeal 
arguing the judge applied the wrong analysis in 
assessing whether the officer had reasonable 
and probable grounds.  
 
In a unanimous endorsement, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal set aside the acquittal. The proper 
test was to simply determine whether the 
officer had reasonable and probable grounds to 
believe the screening device was in proper 
working order. The test was not, as the trial 
judge required, for the Crown to prove the 
device was in fact in good working order. 
Because the trial judge applied the wrong test a 
new trial was ordered. 
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
DOG SNIFF OF PACKAGE NOT 
A SEARCH 
R. v. Taylor, 2006 NLCA 41 
 
Police received information from 
a proven and reliable source that 
a package containing marihuana 
in the name of “Jaimie Taylor” 
would be in a FedEx office. 
Police attended FedEx and an officer examined 
the exterior of the suspect package with 
FedEx’s consent and noted the name of “Jamie 
Taylor” with an undeliverable address. A police 
dog was brought to FedEx and the package was 
placed, with others, at the rear of the 
warehouse. The dog twice indicated there were 
drugs in the package.  
 
Based on the informer information and the 
sniffer dog hit, the police obtained a search 
warrant and opened the package, finding a 
computer concealing three pounds of marihuana. 
The marihuana was removed, the package put 
back together, and the accused was arrested 
after he arrived at FedEx, picked up the 
package, and placed it in his trunk. 
 
At trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court the 
accused argued the dog sniff was a warrantless 
search and that it could not be used as grounds 
to obtain the search warrant. The trial judge, 
however, rejected this submission and ruled the 
dog sniff was not a search under s.8 of the 
Charter. The warrant was properly obtained and 
the marihuana found was admissible. The accused 
then appealed to the Newfoundland Court of 
Appeal again arguing the dog sniff was a search 
and the evidence should be excluded under 
s.24(2) of the Charter.  
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Justice Rowe, authoring the unanimous opinion of 
the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, first 
reviewed search and seizure jurisprudence. 
Section 8 of the Charter protects people from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, 
not every police examination is a “search” for 
constitutional purposes. Only examinations that 
intrude upon a person’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy are s.8 searches. In this light, a court 
will look at the totality of circumstances in 
deciding whether there was a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  
 
Although there may be a reasonable expectation 
of privacy relating to the viewing of a package’s 
contents, such as by opening it or by using an x-
ray to view inside, there was no reasonable 
expectation of privacy relating to the smell of 
the package. Justice Rowe stated: 
 
The contents of a package may reveal some 
insight into the individual’s “biographical core 
of personal information”, whose disclosure 
could affect their “dignity, integrity and 
autonomy”…Such information could be 
disclosed by opening the package to view its 
contents. 
 
Could such personal information be disclosed 
by the dog sniffing the package? No, because 
unlike opening the package (which would allow 
police to see whatever is in it), a dog sniffing 
for drugs can tell us only one thing: are there 
drugs in the package. There can be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in that fact 
alone. [references omitted, paras. 21-22] 
 
Rowe also noted that this case was not one 
where the police conducted a “speculative 
sweep.” In other words they were not conducting 
a random search of all packages at the FedEx 
warehouse. Rather, the police were acting on the 
information of an informant which provided a 
bona fide basis for investigation, even though 
the source information may not have provided 
sufficient grounds to obtain a search warrant by 
itself. 
 
In the circumstances, the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal ruled the trial judge did not err in 
holding that the dog sniff was not a search 
under s.8 of the Charter and the accused’s 
appeal was dismissed. 
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
CANINE ODOUR DETECTION 
AT BUS TERMINAL OK 
R. v. Brown, 2006 ABCA 199 
 
A three member plain clothes 
police team, along with a sniffer 
dog, was patrolling a Greyhound 
bus terminal as part of a 
Jetway project, a program which monitors the 
public for drugs, weapons, proceeds of crime, or 
other contraband at airports, bus depots, or 
train stations. The accused was observed 
disembark from an over-night train carrying a 
bag high over his shoulder. This behaviour drew 
the officer’s attention and he entered into a 
conversation with the accused.  
 
While the officer conversed with the accused, 
he signalled for a police dog handler to bring 
over a dog trained in detecting illegal drug 
odours. The dog immediately indicated the 
presence of drugs in the bag, which had been 
placed on the ground. The accused was arrested 
and 17 ounces of cocaine was found in the bag 
and a small amount of heroin in his clothing.  
  
At trial in the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench 
the accused sought exclusion of the evidence 
under s.24(2) of the Charter because, he argued, 
the police violated his right, among others, to be 
secure against unreasonable search and seizure. 
He submitted that the dog sniff was a 
warrantless search and was therefore 
unreasonable. The trial judge concluded that the 
odour emanating from the bag voluntarily 
brought into a public transportation facility was 
not information in which he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. The accused then 
appealed to the Alberta Court of Appeal arguing 
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the actions of the police dog amounted to a 
search protected under the Charter. 
 
Justice Cote, authoring the majority opinion of 
the Court, first discussed the meaning of a 
search under s.8 of the Charter. For the 
purposes of s.8 a search occurs when the 
government interferes with a person’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, not 
every government examination will intrude upon 
this reasonable expectation and therefore will 
not always be a search. Referring to the 
Supreme Court of Canada decision R. v. Tessling, 
a case dealing with the police use of FLIR, 
Justice Cote noted that there are hierarchies of 
privacy expectations and not all information 
gleaned by the police in a public place about 
contents of a private place is a search.   
 
In holding that the trial judge did not err in 
finding there was no Charter violation respecting 
the dog sniff, Justice Cote wrote: 
 
The privacy interests to be assessed and 
protected under s. 8 of the Charter are not, of 
course, confined to the particular activity or 
type of activity detected in the prosecution at 
hand. Finding drugs does not retroactively 
make any “search” disappear. The relevant 
question is not whether counterfeiters or 
fences or drug smugglers have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy for the tools, 
merchandise or fruits of their trade. The first 
question is whether the ordinary citizen who 
has committed no offence has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy which would be 
significantly invaded by the police action in 
question here. The danger of the police rifling 
through homes or suitcases is not so much 
their finding illegal items like guns, but their 
seeing legal intimate or personal items. So 
here one must first ask whether there would 
have been a “search” under s. 8 if [the 
accused] had had no illegal narcotics in his 
luggage. 
 
In my view (and that of the trial judge) there 
would not. The dog could detect 9 types of 
illegal drugs, and nothing else. Had [the 
accused] had none of the 9 illegal drugs, the 
dog sniff would have had no effect. Innocent 
items such as medicine, food, or perfume, even 
illegal money or burglary tools or smuggled 
cigarettes or guns, would have gone 
undetected. Non-drug odors are a red herring 
here, in my view. [paras. 47-48] 
 
And further, 
 
…No home was involved, the police were in a 
purely public place (not the yard of a home), 
the dog only yielded a crude piece of 
information (yes or no to the presence of an 
unknown quantity of an unknown illegal drug), 
no intimate details of private lives could 
possibly be revealed, the odors came out 
passively, and they were detected by 
something similar to (but more sensitive than) 
an ordinary human nose. There was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy for that 
limited information in that public place.  
 
An obvious loud noise or obvious strong smell 
coming from luggage or from a locker in a bus 
depot can be noted and used by police, as 
defence counsel here properly conceded. All 
that is different here is the use of a dog with 
a nose keener than human noses. But the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Tessling says that 
that is not enough to turn this into a “ search” 
under s. 8… 
 
So I would conclude here that there was no 
search, and no unreasonable search. 
 
I do not intend to begin compiling a catalogue 
myself, as the Supreme Court of Canada says 
not to do that. So I am not ruling on all dog 
sniffs at all times and all places and in all 
manners. What would be the situation if the 
dog were detecting some odor or sound from a 
person, or the dog were trained to give more 
information, or the dog climbed up onto the 
owner of the luggage, or the dog sniffed or 
listened outside a home or hotel room, or the 
dog poked its nose into someone’s pocket. I 
leave for another day and another case. [paras. 
52-55] 
 
Furthermore, even if the dog sniff was a search, 
Justice Cote ruled the evidence would be 
admissible under s.24(2). The majority dismissed 
the accused’s appeal and his conviction was 
affirmed.  
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A Different Opinion 
 
Justice Paperny, on the other hand, disagreed 
with the majority. In her dissenting opinion she 
concluded that the police did violate the 
accused’s rights under s.8. “Odour often reveals 
intensely personal details of lifestyle and 
biographical data that individuals prefer to keep 
to themselves,” said Justice Paperny. “This is 
evidenced by the enormous industry aimed at 
producing and marketing products to mask odour 
on the person, on our effects, and in our homes.” 
She further stated: 
 
The dog sniff was also intrusive in a physical 
sense. Many people are afraid of dogs. The use 
of dogs has an historical connotation that 
cannot be ignored. Dogs can and often are 
intended to be intimidating and their proximity 
to an individual can be highly invasive. So too 
can their enhanced olfactory sense, as any 
person who has been sniffed by a dog, friendly 
or otherwise, can attest. The target of the 
intrusiveness here is the personal luggage and 
its odour; the police dog sniff permits highly 
accurate identification of particular contents 
of the bag which are not on display for all to 
see. 
 
The objective unreasonableness of the use of 
the technique is driven by the nature and 
quality of the information that the technique 
is able to produce…. A dog sniff in the context 
of the special training evidenced in this case, 
in contrast to FLIR technology, provides nearly 
definitive information about the contents of 
luggage, and can reveal private information 
concerning the activities of its owner. 
 
Unlike the heat images produced by FLIR 
technology, the contents and odour of one’s 
personal luggage can reveal intimate details of 
one’s lifestyle and individual personal choices 
and thus constitute protected biographical 
core personal information. Further, it cannot 
be disputed that the reason the police wanted 
the information from the dog sniff was to 
ascertain details about [the accused’s] 
personal lifestyle - that is, his involvement in 
illegal drug activity. 
 
In summary, [the accused] had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his luggage and the 
odour emanating from it and the dog sniff was 
a search. 
 
There was no warrant here. Warrantless 
searches are prima facie unreasonable, absent 
exigent circumstances…. The Crown did not 
establish exigent circumstances, and in any 
case, any exigencies would have been revealed 
only after the unauthorized search occurred. 
On the facts, the R.C.M.P. did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe 
evidence of criminal activity existed (a 
precondition to a genuine belief that such 
evidence maybe lost, removed, destroyed, or 
would disappear absent the unauthorized 
search) until the dog gave the positive 
indication after sniffing the bag. The dog sniff 
led immediately to the arrest, and in turn [the 
accused’s] bag was physically searched to 
confirm the existence of the narcotics 
indicated by the dog. [paras. 135-139] 
 
Justice Paperny would have excluded the 
evidence under s.24(2) and entered an acquittal.  
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
 
CONVICTED SEX OFFENDER 
MUST DEMONSTRATE SOIRA 
ORDER DISPROPORTIONATE 
R. v. Redhead & R. v. McIntyre,  
2006 ABCA 84 
 
In R. v. Redhead, the defendant 
plead guilty to sexual assault for 
forcing a 28 year old female with 
the mental capacity of a 7 year 
old to twice have sexual intercourse with him. He 
was sentenced to 30 months in custody, but the 
trial judge refused to order he register under 
the Sex Offender Information Registry Act 
(SOIRA) because he was drunk at the time, was 
not a pedophile, and was not likely to re-offend. 
 
In R. v. McIntyre, the defendant was convicted 
of sexual assault with a weapon after he picked 
up a prostitute, held a screwdriver to her neck, 
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and had oral sex and sexual intercourse with her. 
He received four years in prison, but the trial 
judge refused to grant a SOIRA order because 
the victim was not a child and the accused had no 
prior related record.  
 
Crown appealed both cases to the Alberta Court 
of Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judges 
erred in not granting SOIRA orders under 
s.490.012 of the Criminal Code. This provision 
requires a person convicted of a “designated 
offence” to comply with SOIRA unless a court is 
satisfied the impact of the order on the guilty 
person, including their privacy and liberty, would 
be grossly disproportionate to the public 
interest in protecting society. A person under a 
SOIRA order must provide information 
concerning their identity and whereabouts and 
report to police on an annual basis. This 
information is entered into a national database 
for convicted sex offenders and assists police in 
investigating sex crimes.  
 
The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s 
appeal. Under s.490.012(4) a court may exempt a 
convicted sex offender from a SOIRA order 
only after assessing the impact on the offender 
and finding it disproportionate to the public 
interest. However, “the offender bears the 
evidentiary burden of establishing that the 
impact of a SOIRA order on him or her would 
outweigh the public interest in protecting 
society by investigating crimes of a sexual 
nature.” The Court stated: 
 
The assessment of how reporting obligations 
might disproportionally impact an offender 
requires an evidentiary foundation. The focus 
of that inquiry must be on the offender's 
present and possible future circumstances, and 
not on the offence itself. 
 
Different evidence is required to assess the 
extent to which the offender will require 
monitoring, which will necessarily include an 
examination of the nature of the particular 
circumstances of the offence and record of 
the offender. But that evidence is irrelevant 
to the determination of the impact of the 
registration and reporting on the offender.  
 
Thus, the analysis under s. 490.012(4) is 
restricted to the impact of a SOIRA order on 
the offender. Nevertheless, that subsection 
clearly contemplates that factors other than 
the offender's privacy and liberty interests 
may be considered, as it requires the court to 
consider the impact on an offender, including 
any impact on the offender's privacy and 
security interests.  
 
Other factors might include unique individual 
circumstances such as a personal handicap, 
whereby the offender requires assistance to 
report… Courts have also considered the 
intangible effects of the legislation, including 
stigma, even if only in the offender's mind; the 
undermining of rehabilitation and reintegration 
in the community; and whether such an order 
might result in police harassment as opposed 
to police tracking… [paras 28-31] 
 
The Court also rejected McIntyre’s argument 
that the impact of the order is self evident 
given the onerous obligations on the offender, 
such as the mandatory reporting requirements 
which could go on for years. The Court stated: 
 
However, given the onus on the offender to 
demonstrate why the impact of such an order 
would be disproportional to the public interest, 
it appears there is no presumption of impact in 
the legislation arising from the length of 
reporting obligations alone. Patently, the 
impact on anyone who is subject to the 
reporting requirements of a SOIRA order is 
considerable. But absent disproportional 
impact, the legislation mandates that anyone 
convicted of a prescribed offence is subject 
to the prescribed reporting period. [para 33] 
 
In both of these cases, the lower courts 
overlooked the lack of evidence on the impact of 
the SOIRA orders on the offenders. The 
Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown’s 
appeals and required both offenders to comply 
with SOIRA orders for 20 years. 
 
Complete case available at www.albertacourts.ab.ca 
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CUMULATIVE FACTORS 
PROVIDE REASONABLE 
GROUNDS 
R. v Johnson, 
(2006) Docket:C42377 (OntCA) 
 
Two uniformed patrol officers 
saw a known crack addict pacing 
back and forth outside a subway 
station. The accused was 
observed walking towards the addict from an 
alleyway, nod his head to the addict, look around, 
reach into his pants pocket, and briefly extend 
his open palm to the addict. After the addict 
looked at the accused’s palm, he closed it, put it 
back in his pocket, and they walked away 
together for a while, then went in separate 
directions. The officers did not hear anything 
said or see what was in the accused’s hand. 
 
He was called over by the officers and was 
arrested for possession of crack cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking. He was searched and the 
police found individually wrapped packages of 
crack cocaine, a knife with residue, and two cell 
phones. At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of 
Justice, the trial judge found the police had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused and he 
was convicted of possessing cocaine for the 
purpose of trafficking.   
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that the trial judge 
erred in finding the police had reasonable 
grounds to arrest him. He suggested the police 
had neither the subjective nor the objective 
foundation upon which to base the arrest.  
 
The Ontario Court of Appeal, however, dismissed 
the appeal. “For an arrest to be lawful, there 
must be both subjective and objective 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that 
an offence has been committed,” stated Court. 
Here, the officer had the required subjective 
belief. As well, the grounds were justifiable 
from an objective point of view.  
 
The reasonable person standing in the shoes of 
the officers would know the particular area 
involved and that the particular location within 
that area was frequently used for drug 
trafficking.  The officers also knew the addict 
was a crack user. Furthermore, the addict was 
pacing in a location known for crack cocaine 
trafficking and there was the guarded mode of 
acknowledgment between the addict and the 
accused, typical of drug transactions. The 
accused also showed the addict a small item in 
his cupped hands, typical of drug deals, and both 
men walked off together. The trial judge did 
not err in finding the police had reasonable and 
probable grounds, on both a subjective and 
objective basis, to arrest.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
STAY NOT PROPER IN 24 PLUS 
HOUR HOLD 
R. v. Mangat, 
(2006) Docket:C40544 (OntCA) 
 
The accused was arrested for 
robbery at 7:10 am where he 
was detained at a police station. 
At 3:00 pm the police obtained 
an inculpatory statement from the accused and 
he was detained until he was transported to 
court for a bail hearing at 8:40 am the following 
morning.  
 
At his trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
judge stayed the proceedings against the 
accused under s.24(1) of the Charter because 
she found the police did not comply with s.503 of 
the Criminal Code, thereby breaching the 
accused’s s.9 Charter right (arbitrary detention). 
The judge found the police could have accessed a 
justice of the peace within the first 10 hours of 
the accused’s detention. Since they did not, his 
detention did not comply with s.503 and was 
unlawful.  
 
The Crown appealed the stay to the Ontario 
Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that it was not 
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warranted. The Court of Appeal agreed with the 
Crown.  A stay of proceedings is a drastic 
remedy reserved for the “clearest of cases” and 
will only be appropriate when the prejudice 
caused by the Charter breach will be 
manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through 
the conduct of the trial or its outcome and there 
is no other remedy reasonably capable of 
removing the prejudice. 
 
The issue before the court was not one of 
punishing the police, but rather whether the 
prejudice caused by the arbitrary detention 
could be adequately addressed by a remedy 
short of a stay. In this case, the Ontario Court 
of Appeal held that excluding the inculpatory 
statement under s.24(2) was an adequate remedy 
to address the prejudice arising from the 
accused’s Charter breach. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed, the stay of proceedings set aside, 
and a new trial ordered with the accused’s 
statement to police excluded.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca  
 
POLICE NEED NOT PROVE 
COMMUNICATION IN PROCESS 
FOR CELLPHONE CHARGE 
R. v. Aisthorpe, 2006 NCLA 40 
 
A police officer saw the accused 
driving with a cellphone on his 
shoulder and his head leaning 
against it to hold it in place. The 
officer did not know if the 
accused was talking on the phone, but stopped 
him and charged him under Newfoundland law 
with operating a motor vehicle while using a 
cellphone.  
 
Under s.176.1 of Newfoundland’s Highway 
Traffic Act it is an offence for a person to use a 
hand-held cellular telephone while driving a 
motor vehicle on a highway.  This is a strict 
liability offence where the Crown must prove the 
actus reus beyond a reasonable doubt. A “cellular 
telephone” is defined as “an apparatus which can 
send and receive a 2 way voice communication…” 
Further, a “hand-held cellular phone” is defined 
as “a cellular phone the use of which requires 
being placed in the proximity to the mouth and 
ear by being held in the hand or by another 
means that uses one or more parts of the body.”  
 
At trial in Newfoundland Provincial Court the 
accused testified he was waiting for a call and 
was “pretty sure” he was not talking to anyone. 
He also claimed that if his phone had rung he 
would have pulled over to answer it. The trial 
judge nonetheless convicted the accused. In the 
judge’s view, the test was not whether someone 
was actually talking or listening on the phone, but 
whether it was useable or in use. The fact it was 
up to the accused’s ear was sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case.  
 
The accused appealed to the Newfoundland 
Supreme Court which overturned the conviction. 
In the appeal court judge’s view, the accused was 
not using the cellphone because there was no 
evidence that he was sending or receiving a 
communication as required by the definition of a 
cell phone under the legislation.  
 
The Crown’s appeal to the Newfoundland Court 
of Appeal was successful. Justice Rowe, 
authoring the unanimous judgment, ruled that a 
person having a hand-held cell phone turned on 
and held between their shoulder and ear while 
operating a motor vehicle was using the cell 
phone contrary to the Highway Traffic Act.   
 
In granting the appeal and reinstating the 
conviction, Justice Rowe examined several areas.  
 
1) the word “use”, as defined in the dictionary, 
would suggest utilizing a cell phone for “any 
purpose”; 
 
2) the purpose of banning cell phone use is to 
prevent drivers from being distracted while 
driving; 
 
3) if the definition of use was restricted to 
sending and receiving a communication, 
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actions such as looking up a number in the cell 
phone’s directory, dialling a number, or 
reviewing numbers of persons who had called 
would not be use, even though these actions 
all give rise to the driver looking away from 
the road and being distracted from driving; 
and 
 
4) the definition of “hand-held cellular phone” 
describes the manner of use—having the cell 
phone in proximity to a person’s mouth and 
ear—which points to a meaning that is wider 
than “sending and receiving a communication”.  
 
In concluding that the accused was using the cell 
phone, Justice Rowe stated: 
 
…I am satisfied that “use” in s. 176.1(2) has a 
wider meaning than that given to it by the 
summary conviction appeal judge (“sending and 
receiving a communication”).  I would hold that 
“use” in s. 176.1(2) encompasses a variety of 
operations of a hand-held cellular telephone 
that could result in the driver being 
distracted, including [the accused’s] actions as 
charged….[para. 32] 
 
The Court of Appeal also rejected the accused’s 
argument that Newfoundland’s cell phone 
legislation violated s.7 of the Charter because it 
was unconstitutionally vague.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
PURPOSE DETERMINES 
APPLICATION OF IMPLIED 
LICENCE DOCTRINE 
R. v. Fowler, 2006 NBCA 90 
 
Two police officers responded to 
reports that the accused drove 
his truck into a vehicle parked at 
his estranged wife’s residence, 
left the scene, was heading to 
his parent’s home, and was possibly impaired.  
The officers proceeded to the accused’s parent’s 
home and saw a truck parked in the driveway 
that had been recently running, as evidenced by 
heat emanating from its underside and an engine 
ticking sound. The house was in total darkness 
but some windows were wide open.  
 
Wanting to speak with the occupants of the 
house to further their investigation, the 
officers knocked on both the front and rear 
doors but received no response. While returning 
to their vehicle the officers heard a voice from 
inside the house state, “Don’t answer the door. 
I’ve been home all night. I’ve been home all 
night.” The officers returned to the back door 
and knocked again. 
 
The accused answered the door, but was dressed 
only in his underwear. He had a strong odour of 
liquor on his breath, his eyes were red and 
glassy, and he was unsteady on his feet. One of 
the officers told the accused he had reasonable 
and probable grounds to believe he left the 
scene of an accident and was impaired. The 
accused replied he had been home all night and 
closed and locked the door.  
 
While the officer discussed the matter with a 
supervisor, the accused exited the house and 
approached the officers. He was cautioned, 
advised of his right to silence, and breath 
samples were demanded. Two breath samples 
subsequently obtained revealed a blood alcohol 
level of 150mg%. The accused was charged with 
impaired operation of a motor vehicle and 
operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol 
content over 80mg%.  
 
At trial in New Brunswick Provincial Court the 
accused argued the certificate of analysis was 
inadmissible because the police violated his right 
to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure under s.8 of the Charter. In the 
accused’s view, the police could not attend at his 
home and knock without a search warrant. 
Because there was no warrant, the observations 
made by the police during the unreasonable 
search tainted the certificate of analysis. The 
Crown, on the other hand, submitted that the 
police had the right to enter onto the property 
to communicate with its occupants under the 
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implied licence doctrine. The observations, 
therefore, did not constitute an unreasonable 
search and the certificate should be admitted.  
 
The trial judge ruled the police attended the 
house to communicate with the occupants, not to 
obtain incriminating evidence against the 
occupant. Accordingly, the accused’s Charter 
rights were not breached and the certificate 
was admitted. The accused was convicted of the 
over 80mg% charge and the impaired driving 
charge was stayed.  
 
The accused’s appeal to the New Brunswick 
Supreme Court was allowed and his conviction 
was overturned. The appeal court judge found 
that one of the police purposes for knocking at 
the door was to obtain evidence the accused was 
impaired. The police, therefore, exceeded their 
authority under implied invitation to knock and 
violated the accused’s Charter rights in the 
process. The breathalyzer results should have 
been excluded under s.24(2) and a new trial was 
ordered. The Crown then appealed to the New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal.  
 
Under the common law there is a long-standing 
principle that people, including police officers, 
have implied licence to approach and knock on 
someone’s door for the purpose of convenient 
communication with the occupant(s). If the 
police purpose is to communicate with the 
occupant(s) there is no search for constitutional 
purposes. However, if the police approach the 
residence to secure evidence against the 
occupant then a search has taken place and a 
reasonableness enquiry will be undertaken under 
s.8. If the police have a dual purpose in mind (eg. 
to communicate with the occupant and secure 
evidence against the occupant) the police 
conduct will constitute a search and s.8 is 
engaged.  
 
In this case the trial judge rejected the 
accused’s position that the police attended the 
residence to obtain incriminating evidence and 
held their purpose was to communicate with the 
occupant(s).  This finding was unassailable based 
on the facts and the appeal court judge 
exceeded her authority when she determined 
that one of the police purposes was to obtain 
evidence against the accused. The Crown’s appeal 
was allowed and the accused’s conviction was 
restored.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
 
 
BALANCE 
By Kelly Keith 
 
Balance is defined as the ability 
to maintain the center of mass 
over a base of support and is 
sometimes referred to as the 
relationship between the ears 
and the hips.  A body’s center 
of gravity is an inch or two above or below the 
navel. 
 
Why is balance important to a police officer?  If 
a police officer loses their balance when 
attacked they are likely to be in a ground fight. 
   
However, a police officer on the ground does 
NOT mean they are losing the battle, but it does 
have some disadvantages such as: 
 
• the police officer is more susceptible to injury; 
• a psychological / physical disadvantage for the 
officer; 
• a psychological / physical advantage for the 
suspect; 
• increased danger from multiple attackers; 
• disarming chances increased; 
• extremely exhausting to the officer; 
• poor delivery system for the officer’s striking 
techniques and intermediate weapons; and 
• immediate disengagement from the subject 
cannot be achieved. 
 
Trainers generally train officers to fight to 
their feet or, in the case of an officer’s physical 
dominance, to a cuffing position.  Statistics show 
that the three most common ways officers end 
up on the ground are: 
 
1. the officer is pushed to the ground; 
2. the officer is pulled to the ground; or 
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3. the officer is tackled to the ground. 
 
Hopefully, officers are trained or take it upon 
themselves to know what to do once on the 
ground. But if they understand and train on 
“balance” they may not have to deal with going to 
the ground at all! 
 
The most stable support for an officer is having 
their feet just wider than shoulder width apart.  
This is not always possible during confrontations. 
However, by understanding this concept and 
attempting to keep a wide stance (or base of 
support) an officer is less likely to be taken to 
the ground.  A stable base of support allows an 
officer to change direction easily. Too wide of a 
stance, such as the “horse stance” with a very 
wide base of support, will not allow a change of 
direction quickly, which is not a good trade off.  
Lowering one’s center of gravity also adds 
stability. But again, if one’s body is too low they 
will sacrifice the ability to change direction 
quickly.   
 
Understanding the importance of balance and 
how to stay in balance is not enough.  One must 
train “off balance”. But how does one train this 
way? 
 
• By simply making the base of support smaller 
(standing on one foot or having feet close 
together) a person’s balance is challenged.  A 
great example to increase balance and 
stimulate muscle fibers that would generally 
not be stimulated, is by standing on one foot 
while doing some exercises.  For example, 
when doing 3 sets of dumbbell curls do the 
first 2 sets on both feet and then the third 
set by alternating standing on one foot for 
the first 5 repetitions and the opposite foot 
for the remaining 5.  This can be done with 
almost any exercise when standing, such as 
presses, side raises, tricep pushdowns, etc. 
 
• Use Balance training tools such as Bosu Balls, 
Balance Boards, or Bongo Boards.  For 
example, try doing squats while attempting to 
maintain balance. Squats on Physio balls are 
not recommended because a fall can easily 
mean a torn ACL – Always look at whether the 
risk is worth the benefit? This does not mean 
giving up power or strength training, but 
simply adding an element to training, which in 
the end will give the user more strength and 
power in an unstable environment. 
 
• Visual systems have a great deal to do with 
balance.  Postural sway will increase 20 – 70 % 
simply by closing one’s eyes and standing up. 
Stressing one’s balance can be accomplished 
by activities, such as closing eyes during safe 
standing stretches, easy slow kicks to a bag, 
etc. 
 
• There is dynamic balance training, such as rag 
doll drills where each person has a good 
quality Judo Gi on.  They stand within arms 
reach and grab onto the collars.  DO NOT try 
to torque a partner down to the ground. This 
may cause injury. Rather, simply try to 
displace an opponent’s balance while they try 
same.  Once the person’s balance is displaced 
(ie. one foot off the ground) start again.  This 
is enhanced if the interview stance is used to 
do these drills, which makes it more job 
specific training!    
 
• CORE strength (Butt and Gut) is of the 
utmost importance in keeping balance and 
should be utilized during all balance training.  
Using medicine balls and physio balls are 
great ways to have dynamic and functional 
core strength exercises. 
 
• Using Physio balls for dumbbell chest presses 
instead of a flat secure bench is a great way 
to address functional strength and balance 
(use light weights and/or a spotter first).  
Think about the benefits of adding balance 
challenging exercises into every routine! 
 
Start varying routines to address balance and 
great results in both balance and strength will 
occur.  Utilize the above principles by varying 
base support (feet) and use your imagination 
(safely) to work with these principles.   
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SEVERAL FACTORS DETERMINE 
WHETHER DETENTION 
OCCURS 
R. v. Grant,  
(2006) Docket:C43132 (OntCA) 
 
Two plainclothes officers, 
engaged in proactive policing in 
a neighbourhood school hot 
spot, asked a uniformed officer 
to stop the accused and chat with him after they 
saw him walk by in a “suspicious” manner. He had 
“stared” at the officers in an unusual manner and 
“fidgeted” with his pants and coat which looked 
suspicious. The uniformed officer stood in the 
accused’s path, told him to keep his hands in 
front of him, and began to question him. The two 
plainclothes officers arrived and stood behind 
the uniformed officer. The accused was initially 
only asked for identification, but then he was 
asked if he had ever been arrested and whether 
he had anything on him he shouldn’t. Although 
initially saying “no,” he did say he had a small 
amount of marihuana and, when asked if there 
was anything else, admitted to having a loaded 
revolver. The accused was arrested, his revolver 
seized from his waist pouch, and he was charged 
with five firearms offences.  
 
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the 
accused’s motion to exclude the gun from 
evidence because his rights under ss. 8, 9 and 
10(b) of the Charter had been violated was 
dismissed. The trial judge found there was no 
detention. He ruled that the conversation 
between the uniformed officer and the accused 
was merely “chit chat”, while the officer’s 
statement for the accused to keep his hands in 
front of him was a “request”, not a direction or 
demand.” Finally, the accused could have simply 
walked around the officers and kept going. He 
was convicted on all counts and sentenced to 18 
months imprisonment.  
 
The accused appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal arguing, in part, that he was detained and 
that the police questioning amounted to a search. 
Further, if his rights were violated the accused 
submitted the revolver should have been 
excluded as evidence.  
 
The Detention 
 
Section 9 of the Charter guarantees that 
everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily 
detained. If the police have reasonable grounds 
to detain for an investigative purpose the 
detention will not be arbitrary. However, in this 
case the Crown conceded the police did not have 
reasonable grounds to detain. Rather the Crown’s 
position was that there was no detention at all.  
 
Justice Laskin, authoring the unanimous appeal 
court judgment, first reviewed what constitutes 
a detention for Charter purposes. A detention 
under the Charter can occur in two ways: 
physical or “psychological.” A psychological 
detention can occur when a police officer gives a 
direction or demand to a citizen in which the 
citizen feels (reasonably believes) they have no 
choice but to obey (and submits or acquiesces to 
the direction or demand), even if there is no 
legal authority for the demand or direction and 
thus no offence committed for failing to comply. 
Justice Laskin noted: 
 
The definition of “psychological detention” 
reflects a judicial balance between competing 
values. On the one hand, the police have the 
duty and the authority to investigate and 
prevent crime in order to keep our community 
safe. In carrying out their duty, they must 
interact daily with ordinary citizens. Not every 
such encounter between the police and a 
citizen amounts to a constitutional “detention.” 
This court and other courts have recognized 
that police must be able to speak to a citizen 
without triggering that citizen’s Charter 
rights. 
… … … 
On the other hand, ordinary citizens must have 
the right to move freely about their 
community. Thus, the police cannot detain a 
citizen for questioning unless they are 
authorized by law to do so… [paras. 10-12] 
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In describing the criteria for a psychological 
detention, Justice Laskin stated: 
 
…a “psychological” detention includes three 
elements:  a police direction or demand to an 
individual; the individual’s voluntary compliance 
with the direction or demand, resulting in a 
deprivation of liberty or other serious legal 
consequences; and the individual’s reasonable 
belief that there is no choice but to comply. 
 
The accused sought “bright-line” rules governing 
whether or not a police-citizen encounter 
amounted to a detention, suggesting that merely 
asking questions about identity would not be 
“psychological detention”, while questions about 
personal possessions or inviting incriminating 
responses would. Justice Laskin rejected this 
submission, recognizing that police-citizen 
encounters take on such a myriad of 
circumstances and contexts that bright–line 
rules were not desirable. Rather, a fact-specific 
and context sensitive inquiry must be made into 
whether a police-citizen encounter gives rise to 
a detention.  
 
In this case, Justin Laskin ruled the accused was 
psychologically detained, although it was a 
difficult and close case, because of the 
following: 
 
• [The uniformed officer’s] initial demand:  Early in 
the encounter, [the uniformed officer] stood in 
front of the [accused], blocked his path on the 
sidewalk, and told him to keep his hands in front 
of him where [the uniformed officer] could see 
them.  …[T]hese words coming from a uniformed 
officer standing three feet away, amounted to a 
demand, which the [accused] was not free to 
ignore.  From the outset, then, [the uniformed 
officer] effectively took control of the 
[accused’s] physical movements.  Equally 
important, the demand, coming at the beginning 
of the encounter, established the atmosphere for 
the remainder of it. 
 
• The actions of [the plainclothes officers]:  These 
two plainclothes officers did not stay in their 
car, which would have mitigated the intimidating 
nature of the encounter.  Instead they got out of 
their car, showed the [accused] their police 
badges, and stood behind [the uniformed 
officer].   
 
• The positions of the three officers:  [the 
uniformed officer] stood in his interview stance, 
three feet away from the [accused].  Every time 
the [accused] moved, [the uniformed officer] 
moved, in order to maintain their relative 
positions.  [The plainclothes officers] stood 
behind [the uniformed officer], four to five feet 
away from the [accused].  These three officers – 
each bigger then the [accused] – effectively 
formed a small phalanx blocking the path in which 
the [accused] was walking.  In doing so, the 
officers exerted control over the [accused’s] 
movements throughout the encounter.   
 
• [The uniformed officer’s] questions:  [The 
uniformed officer’s] questions went well beyond a 
mere request for identification or other non-
incriminating information.  Questions about 
whether the [accused] had ever been arrested or 
was carry something illegal invited inculpatory 
answers.  The officers frankly acknowledged that 
they were looking for answers that would give 
them grounds to arrest or search the [accused].  
These questions, coming after [the uniformed 
officer’s] initial demand, amounted to further 
“demands”.   
 
• The [accused’s] answers:  The [accused] 
acquiesced to all the officers’ demands.  He put 
his hands in front of him, and then he gave 
incriminating answers, leading to his arrest, the 
police’s search, and the ultimate deprivation of 
his liberty. 
 
• The [accused’s] manner of answering the police’s 
questions:  Although the [accused] did not testify 
on the motion, his failure to do so is not fatal to 
his claim because the standard for establishing 
compulsion is objective.  The question the court 
must decide is whether the [accused] reasonably 
believed that he was detained… In my view the 
court can reasonably infer compulsion from the 
[accused’s] manner of answering the police’s 
questions and from the answers themselves.  The 
[accused] paced nervously and hesitated before 
answering [the uniformed officer’s] questions.  
Although he did not testify, I infer from his 
manner of responding to the police’s questions 
that he did not believe he had the right to walk 
away and end the conversation, but rather 
believed that he had no choice but to answer 
their questions.  Moreover it seems to me that 
the [accused’s] belief was objectively reasonable.  
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In the light of his answers, the suggestion that 
the [accused] knew he had the right not to 
incriminate himself seems unreasonable.  I note 
that at no time during the encounter did the 
officers tell the [accused] that he was free to go 
or free not to respond to their questions. 
 
• The [accused’s] age:  The [accused] was not a 
sophisticated adult.  The [accused] was an 18-
year-old youth, facing three police officers 
standing a few feet away from him in his path on 
the sidewalk.   
 
• The duration of the encounter:  The entire 
encounter, from the time [the uniformed 
officer’s] stopped the [accused] until his arrest, 
lasted about seven minutes.   This was not a long 
encounter, but it was not so short that it could 
not give rise to a detention.   
  
Since the accused was detained and the Crown 
conceded the police did not have reasonable 
grounds to detain him, the detention was 
arbitrary and a violation of s.9 of the Charter.  
 
The Search  
 
The accused argued the police questioning 
amounted to a search that began when they 
asked him whether he had anything he shouldn’t. 
Justice Laskin, however, disagreed. He stated: 
 
The divide between questions that begin a 
search and questions that do not is sometimes 
not easy to draw. In this case, I am not 
persuaded that the police’s question to the 
[accused] “if he had anything that he 
shouldn’t” began a search. In my view, the 
search began, at the earliest, after the 
[accused] admitted to possession of marijuana. 
At that point, however, the police had 
reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the 
[accused]. Then, when in answer to [the 
uniformed officer’s] follow-up question “is that 
it”, the [accused] admitted to carrying the 
revolver, the police had the right to search 
the [accused], incident to arresting him. 
Indeed they had that right even if they did 
not arrest him…[reference omitted, para. 33] 
 
The question was general in nature and the police 
had not already formed the intention to conduct 
a search. The question was unlike other cases, 
where accused persons were asked to empty 
their pockets, asked what was in their open gym 
bag, or asked what was in their pocket after the 
police had touched it and felt a hard lump. 
Although those questions amounted to a search, 
the nature of the officer’s question in this case 
did not. They were asked in a different context. 
Since there was no search, there was no violation 
under s.8 of the Charter.  
 
Evidence 
 
Although the accused’s s.9 of the Charter right 
had been breached, the evidence was 
nonetheless admissible under s.24(2). Even 
though the revolver was “derivative evidence” 
that arose from the accused’s answers (which 
were “conscriptive evidence”,  he had a lesser 
expectation of privacy in a public area, the 
detention was brief, the questioning minimally 
intrusive, the police did not physically restrain 
the accused until they arrested him, and they 
acted in good faith. Furthermore, possession of 
a loaded firearm in public is very serious, the 
accused was near several schools, the evidence 
was crucial to the Crown’s case, and the evidence 
was entirely reliable.  Therefore, admitting the 
evidence would not bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.  
 
The accused’s conviction appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca 
 
WHOLE PICTURE PROVIDES 
REASONABLE GROUNDS 
R. v. Mohammadi, 2006 QCCA 930 
 
Officers received information 
that a significant cache of 
drugs was to be found in an 
unidentified unit within an 
apartment building and that 
the accused made use of this facility. A 
briefing was held later that afternoon where 
the accused’s and another suspect’s photograph 
were distributed along with the description of 
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the vehicle the accused used, a Yukon, including 
its licence plate. 
 
The building was placed under surveillance and 
about an hour later a vehicle resembling the 
accused’s arrived on the scene. It was parked in 
front of but across the street from the 
apartment building. Within a very short time, 
another vehicle arrived and parked parallel to 
the accused’s vehicle. Both drivers appeared to 
talk to each other and the other vehicle then 
departed.  
 
The accused then emerged from the parked 
vehicle, crossed the street, and entered the 
apartment building using a key. Within a few 
minutes, he was seen exiting the building 
carrying a black plastic bag. He appeared 
nervous and kept looking behind him and in all 
directions. He entered the parked vehicle but 
precipitously left the vehicle when he saw the 
police arriving to intercept him. He was seen 
throwing the black plastic bag and the car keys 
onto the street, but his attempt to flee failed 
and he was arrested not far away. The black 
plastic bag subsequently was found to contain 
approximately two kilograms of heroin.  His 
vehicle was searched and $5,000 cash and 
107.2 grams of hashish were also uncovered.  
 
At his trial in Quebec Superior Court on charges 
of possessing heroin and hashish for the purpose 
of trafficking the accused presented a motion to 
have his arrest declared illegal and to exclude 
the evidence obtained thereafter. In his view, 
there was an insufficient basis to proceed with 
the arrest under s.495 of the Criminal Code.  
The judge, however, found the arrest lawful. The 
accused was known to the police, he had a prior 
drug trafficking criminal record, he had 
previously been under surveillance for possible 
trafficking of drugs with his cousin, the police 
had information that he would be present at a 
location that was a cornerstone of trafficking in 
heroin and his conduct in leaving the building 
with a plastic bag after entering without a bag 
was suspicious, as was his demeanour when he 
left the building to cross the road to reach his 
parked vehicle, which they had received 
information earlier in the day.  
 
The accused was found guilty by a jury.  He was 
sentenced to 11 years and seven months in 
prison. The drugs were ordered destroyed, the 
$5,000 cash confiscated as well as a pager and a 
cellular telephone, and he was prohibited from 
weapons for 10 years.  
 
The accused appealed to the Quebec Court of 
Appeal arguing, among other grounds, that the 
trial judge erred in failing to find his arrest 
illegal and to exclude the evidence obtained 
incidental to a search. Although the timing of 
the accused’s motion to exclude the evidence at 
trial was not proper, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
nonetheless commented on the merits of it. 
Justice Hilton stated: 
 
…[the accused] argues that the information on 
which the police acted on the afternoon in 
question was insufficient to justify his arrest. 
This information, however, included the specific 
identity of [the accused], his photograph, a 
description of the vehicle he would be driving 
with the licence plate, along with the location of 
the building in which the drugs were said to be 
found. In my view, this constituted an adequate 
basis to proceed to his arrest without a warrant 
in light of his conduct as it was observed by the 
police when he arrived on the scene…. Not the 
least of these factors was his attempt to flee 
after he had taken his position at the wheel in 
the Yukon when the vehicle was intercepted, 
after which he was seen throwing the plastic bag 
onto the middle of Queen Mary Road.  
 
As far as the items seized subsequent to the 
arrest are concerned, this issue was not raised 
before the trial judge. Since there is no 
judgment of the trial judge on the subject, there 
is nothing for this Court to review…. In any event, 
having abandoned the plastic bag in which the 
heroin was found by throwing it onto Queen Mary 
Road, [the accused] can no longer contend for a 
privacy interest with respect to the contents of 
the bag. [references omitted, para. 54-55] 
 
The appeal was dismissed.  
 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org 
